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Introduction: the rise and fall of European mercantilism 
~~~"~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~ 
At the start of the first millennium, western Europe was the most peripheral 
region in Eurasia. Like Africa, its exports largely consisted of forest products 
and slaves, and it had direct economic links with just two other Eurasian 
regions - eastern Europe and the Islamic world. By contrast, the Islamic 
world had direct economic contacts with all the regions of the then known 
world: eastern and western Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the steppe societies of 
central Asia, and the highly developed civilizations of south Asia, southeast 
Asia, and east Asia (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007). 
By the eighteenth century, western Europe was no longer a peripheral 
appendage of the Eurasian landmass, but had become geographically and 
politically central. It was now in direct contact with all other regions of 
Eurasia, as well as with sub-Saharan Africa, but more importantly it controlled 
both North and South America, which were fully integrated into the world 
economy, importing slaves from Africa, exporting a variety of colonial goods to 
Europe, and exporting silver both to Europe and to Asia via the Philippines. As 
for eastern Europe, it was now in direct contact not just with central Asia and 
the Muslim world, but with east Asia and North America as well, as a result of 
Russia's Siberian conquests, which would prove to be the most enduring of all 
the European imperialisms of that time. 
In contrast to China, which was relatively self-sufficient, European mer-
chants and states had a strong interest in seeking out direct routes to sub-
Saharan gold deposits, thus bypassing the Muslim middlemen who controlled 
the trans-Saharan trade; purchasing African slaves and using these on the sugar 
plantations of newly discovered offshore African islands; and ultimately in 
circumnavigating Africa, reaching Asian spice markets directly, and again 
cutting out Muslim (and Venetian) middlemen. Once Columbus stumbled 
upon the Americas, Europeans had every incentive to exploit the vast resources 
of this New World as fully as possible. All of these activities were extremely 
lucrative, and the mutual dependence of Power and Plenty (Viner, 1948) meant 
that states as well as merchants had a powerful motive to pursue them. Trade 
profited merchants, but also yielded revenues to the state; while the state needed 
revenues to secure trading opportunities for its merchants, by force if necessary. 
Trade and empire were thus inextricably linked in the minds of European 
statesman during the early modern period, which explains the incessant mer-
cantilist warfare of the time. 
The eighteenth century saw the gradual rise to preeminence of Britain in this 
struggle for power and plenty in the west, while Russia became dominant in the 
east. The Iberians continued their hold on Latin America, but the seventeenth 
century saw Portugal being replaced in the Indian Ocean and southeast Asia by 
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Figure 4.1 Number of ships sailing to Asia, per decade (de Vries, 2003) 
the Dutch. 1648 was an important turning point, marking the end of the long-
standing war between the Netherlands and Spain. This freed up silver and 
soldiers, two essential "inputs" for the Dutch East India Company's activities in 
Asia, and facilitated a series of conquests - in Ceylon, on the Malabar coast, and 
in the East Indies. By the late seventeenth century, the Dutch had succeeded in 
controlling the supply of spices such as cloves, leading to a dramatic reduction 
in their exports, and an end to southeast Asia's "Age of Commerce." As 
Figure 4.1 shows, the Dutch maintained their dominant position in 
European-Asian seaborne trade until the end of the eighteenth century. 
Meanwhile, the British found in India an abundant supply of several commod-
ities, notably cotton textiles, which they exported not only to Europe, but to 
Africa and the Americas as well. By the third quarter of the eighteenth century, 
and after military victories at Plassey in 1757 and Buxar in 1764, the English 
East India Company was embarked on a path which would ultimately lead to 
dominion over the entire subcontinent. After the Bengal mutiny of 1857, India 
formally became part of the British Empire. 
In western Europe, the triangular struggle for domination between the 
Netherlands, France, and England became a bilateral struggle between the 
latter two powers following William of Orange's takeover of the British 
throne in 1688-1689. England and France fought during the Nine Years 
War (1689-1697), the War of the Spanish Succession (170 1-1713), and the 
Trade and 
War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). The Seven Years War (1756-
1763) was an important victory for Britain, which gained control of France's 
North American possessions as well as several islands and ports in the 
Caribbean and along the African and Indian coasts. In eastern Europe, 
Russia under Peter the Great and Catherine the Great was strengthening 
its position as a great European power, defeating Sweden in the Great 
Northern War, absorbing the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania and much 
of Poland, and expanding to the south at the expense of the Tartar khanates 
and the Ottoman Empire. Russia had already expanded eastwards as far as 
the Pacific by the middle of the seventeenth century; it now had secure 
footholds on both the Baltic and Black Sea coasts. 
All these European powers pursued a variety of mercantilist policies, 
designed to enrich both the state and the local merchant class. These included 
protecting local industries against foreign competition, protecting the local 
shipping industry by preventing foreign merchants from trading with either 
the mother country or its colonies, and putting in place a variety of policies 
designed to extract as much profit as possible from those colonies. Empires 
yielded financial benefits by providing control over precious metal supplies (in 
Latin America); giving access to abundant supplies of slaves (Africa); allowing 
the cultivation of warm-climate crops such as tobacco and cotton, or trapping 
furs in colder climates, and selling these on to consumers in Europe (the 
Americas and north Asia); or allowing control over trade routes or, better 
yet, the sources of supply of scarce commodities such as spices (Asia). 
Such considerations were also present at the time of the Ottoman expansion 
into central and eastern Europe, although the desire to spread Islam was 
another motivation, just as spreading Christianity was a concern of the early 
Iberian explorers. Booty, control over trade routes, and (in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries) access to the silver mines of Serbia and Macedonia were all 
important motives for the Turks, and indeed the prospect of plunder can help 
to explain why many Christians fought on the Ottoman side. Furthermore, the 
Ottomans actively intervened to prevent the Portuguese from obtaining a 
monopoly of the spice trade in the Indian Ocean, fighting the interlopers 
both directly along the Persian Gulf and indirectly via their support for the 
sultan of Acheh, from where pepper continued to be exported to Ottoman-held 
territory, and from there to Venice. This allowed the Ottomans to continue 
enjoying the rents from the transit trade until the appearance of the Dutch and 
English in the Indian Ocean in the seventeenth century. The Ottomans were 
not mercantilists, in that they were not concerned with the interests of domestic 
merchants or producers, and correctly understood that imports were desirable, 
and that the fewer exports were needed to pay for these imports the better. 
However, they were also sensitive to the mutual dependence of Power and 
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Plenty, which was a general feature of the Eurasian geopolitical landscape at a 
time when the Military Revolution was making warfare more expensive, and 
reducing the number of states that were militarily viable at any given time. 
This mercantilist system was swept away in the early nineteenth century as a 
result of technological and geopolitical change. Paradoxically, partly at least as a 
result of British successes there, the beginning of the end occurred in North 
America. As a number of observers predicted following the end of the Seven 
Years War, without a French presence threatening the British colonists there, 
those colonists would now find it easier to press for independence from the 
mother country. The fiscal crisis to which the conflict gave rise provided one 
trigger for the American Revolution, which ended with the Peace of Paris in 
1783. French involvement was crucial for the rebellion's success, but this in turn 
led to a fiscal crisis in France which again was one of the triggers leading to 
revolution there. When war between Britain and France broke out yet again in 
1793, it now had an additional ideological dimension adding to the severity and 
duration of the conflict, which only finally ended with the French defeat at 
Waterloo in 1815. By that time, Napoleon's invasion ofIberia in 1807 had been 
followed by a series of revolutions in Latin America, and by the 1820s inde-
pendent republics (or an empire in the case of Brazil) had been established 
across Central and South America. Apart from Spanish Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
and British Canada, virtually nothing remained of Europe's N ew World 
empires. While these newly independent states adopted highly protectionist 
policies during the nineteenth century, those tariffs would be imposed in the 
context of a broadly multilateral international trading system, in which there 
were no more bilateral mercantilist restrictions on trade. 
Several other factors promoted globalization between 1815 and 1870. The 
post -war settlement, ushered in by the Congress of Vienna, led to a remarkably 
durable peace in Europe. Despite the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian war, 
and a number of smaller conflicts, and despite the fact that the period ended 
with the disaster of the Great War, the century after Waterloo was a peaceful 
one by European standards. The new transport technologies of the Industrial 
Revolution, described in Chapter 8 of this volume, dramatically reduced trans-
port costs. Geopolitically, new industrial military technologies increased the 
relative power of Europe and its most important overseas offshoot, the United 
States. The half-century following Waterloo saw major European imperial 
advances in India, North Africa, and elsewhere, as well as the infamous 
Opium Wars, which forcibly opened Chinese markets to trade. Meanwhile, 
the United States expanded overland across North America, while Russia 
continued to expand in Asia. European states forced more or less free trade 
on their imperial possessions or on nominally independent countries such as 
China, Japan, and Siam. 
The period also saw a gradual move towards trade liberalization in Europe. 
Early liberalizers were typically smaller countries, such as the Netherlands and 
Denmark. The latter country had abolished import prohibitions and adopted 
low tariffs as early as 1797, while the Dutch moved to a relatively liberal trade 
policy in 1819, having seen the Dutch East India Company being destroyed 
during the war. The first major economy to liberalize was Britain, where power 
was shifting to export-oriented urban interests. Liberal reforms in the 1820s 
and 1830s were followed by Robert Peel's historic decision to abolish the Corn 
Laws in 1846, and move the United Kingdom to a unilateral policy of agricul-
tural and industrial free trade, against the objections oflandlords and much of 
his own Tory Party. There followed further moves towards liberalization in 
countries such as Austria-Hungary, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, 
Norway, and Denmark (Bairoch, 1989, pp. 20-36). For example, in 1849 Spain 
abolished its navigation laws and suppressed prohibitive tariffs, and the 
Spanish went on to liberalize imports of inputs into railway construction in 
the mid-1850s. Average tariffs were falling throughout the 1850s in the major 
European powers (Accominotti and Flandreau, 2008). 
Trade liberalization was not universal. Russia and Austria-Hungary 
remained extremely protectionist throughout almost all the period, only liber-
alizing slightly in the late 1860s. The Ottoman Empire actually became more 
protectionist during the period, not less, although this is explained by the fact 
that it had previously been limited to a maximum 3 percent tariff as a result of 
various treaties signed with west European powers. In 1838, the Turks obtained 
the right to raise their tariffs to 5 percent, but at the cost of abolishing all 
monopolies and prohibitions. Overall, however, the period between Waterloo 
and 1870 was one in which both trade policy and technology were integrating 
international commodity markets. The switch from mercantilism to modernity 
was now complete. 
Quantitative trends, 1700-1870 
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Trade volumes 
Using the shipping data in Figure 4.1, Jan de Vries (2003) estimates that the 
tonnage returned from Asia to Europe grew at 1.01 percent per annum during 
the sixteenth century, 1.24 percent during the seventeenth, 1.16 percent during 
the eighteenth, and at 1.1 percent over the three centuries as a whole. O'Rourke 
and Williamson (2002a), using a more eclectic mix of data, calculate average 
growth rates per annum of European trade with both Asia and the Americas of 
1.26 percent during the sixteenth century, 0.66 percent during the seventeenth, 
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1.26 percent during the eighteenth, and 1.06 percent per annum overall. An 
average growth rate of roughly 1 percent per annum over a period of three 
centuries was an impressive achievement relative to what had gone before, and 
led to Europe, or at least the maritime powers of western Europe, becoming 
more open, albeit from very low levels. According to Maddison (2003a), west 
European GD P grew at roughly 0.4 percent per annum between 1500 and 1820, 
implying rising ratios of intercontinental trade to GDP. 1 As a result, trade with 
Asia, Africa, and America was a very important share of European trade in 1790 
(Table 4.1). 
The wars of 1792-1815 and the Industrial Revolution were a turning point 
for European trade, dramatically increasing the relative importance of the 
United Kingdom (contrast Tables 4.1 and 4.2 with Table 4.3), and reducing 
European trade-to-GDP ratios. Both phenomena are partly explained by the 
fact that pre-1800 trade-to-GDP ratios were inflated by entrepot trade 
(Table 4.4), which declined following the end of the "first" French and 
Iberian colonial empires and the collapse of the Dutch East India Company. 
Trade started growing again during the 1830s. Between 1820 and 1870, the 
volume of trade grew ninefold (Table 4.3) and the European trade-to-GDP 
ratio more than doubled (Table 4.5). 
Commodity price convergence 
~ ====~==_~_~~=~~~~W~W~_~~WM~'=MWMWMW~~MW~_'~'~~~W~~~~~'~WM_~'~'~'WM~~'~'~~~'=~'=_W 
Perhaps surprisingly, the increase in early modern trade volumes between 
Europe and the rest of the world was not accompanied by commodity price 
convergence, at least according to the data that have been analyzed up to now 
(O'Rourke and Williamson, 2002b). Figure 4.2 shows that the ratio of the 
Amsterdam to the Asian prices for pepper and cloves did not fall before 
the nineteenth century, and there was substantial price divergence for cloves 
in the 1650s, coinciding with the establishment of Dutch control over clove 
supplies around that time. Mercantilist policies could have directly prevented 
price convergence during this period, as the figures for cloves suggest, but 
mercantilism also created an international political environment in which 
wars were frequent, and this was perhaps the key factor preventing long-run 
price convergence. Peaks in the clove price gaps during the first and second 
Anglo-Dutch wars, the Seven Years War, and the wars of 1792-1815, lend 
credence to this view. More systematic price evidence is available for the latter 
conflict, and shows clearly that warfare led to a dramatic, worldwide 
1 The Maddison figures probably represent an upper bound, given the lower growth figures (around 0.1 % per annum) 
calculated by van Zanden (200Sa) and Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2007). 
Table 4.1 European trade c .1790 
Britain (1784--86) (including trade 11.3 11.5 6.3 7;3 2.8 0.8 40.0 I 49% 
with Ireland) 
France (1787) 12.8 11.7 9.7 5.3 6.0 0.4 45.91 38% 
Netherlands (using 1770 trade 9.3 3.6 8.3 (including reexports) 0.7 (including reexports) 3.8 (colonial goOds) 21.9 20% 
composition) 2.4 (Europer goods) 
Spain (1788-92) (ROW; Americas) 7.2 2.8 3.5 1.9 1.4 2,2 119.0 I 361'k 
Portugal (1796-1806) (ROW: Brazil) 4.6 2.7 1.4 1.3 3.9 1.4 . 15.3 35% 
Sources: See Table 4.5, and Pedreira, 1993; Cuenca-Esteban, 1989; and Marshal!, 1833. 
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Table 4.2 European merchant fleet, c.1790 
Tons Percentage 
United *<lRgdi>M 88t,963 
f-rance 729,34() 
Netherlands 397,709 
Oenlnark and NorWay 386,020 
~taly ,Trieste, and R~usa 
Hamburg,Brernen,:t..tlbecl<,Ro&took,Dantzig} andPtUS$ia 
352.713 
181,308 
Sweden 
Spall'l 
Portugal 
Russia 
Total 
Source: Romano, 1962. 
169,279 
149,460 
84;843 
39,394 
3,372,029 
Table 4.3 European real trade, 1820-1870 
AuStria 
BelgiOM 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
S~and 
Uni'!ed Kingj:jon'l 
W$jght~avei-aiJe 
Llnitei:fStates ., 
Source: Maddison, 2001. 
1820 Growth 1820-1870 
$million 1990 
:t:694% 
'tJ,a:45% 
4E1~% '-l!~~ 
:+:~ 
::+~~ 
>~"8%. 
4793% 
<-l!~~()10% 
26.2% 
21.6% 
11.B% 
11.4% 
10.5% 
5.4% 
5.0% 
4.4% 
2.5% 
1.2% 
100% 
disintegration of commodity markets (O'Rourke, 2006). For example, the price 
of wheat rose by over 40 percent during 1807-14 relative to textiles in Britain, 
which imported wheat and exported textiles, but it fell in France, which was a 
wheat exporter and cotton textile importer. Similarly, the price of raw cotton 
rose relative to textiles in Europe, but fell substantially in the United States. 
Figure 4.2 shows dramatic price convergence between Southeast Asia and the 
Netherlands once the wars had ended, and a vast array of evidence documents 
international price convergence more generally during the nineteenth century. 
Figure 4.3 shows that while the Anglo-American wheat price gap fluctuated 
widely before 1840 or so, around a roughly constant trend, it started to drop 
dramatically after that date, coinciding with the commencement of large-scale 
shipments of wheat between the United States and Britain. Jacks (2005, p. 399) 
Trade and empire 
Table 4.4 Entrep6t and special trade 
Biit8in .~ 7''''''-.... '
ftant6 ~r7'87} 
Netherlands (using 
'11~tr~ 
, cQmpOsition) 
$pEiln (178Wi}' 
PQrtt,l:gaI 
.(1196:-1806) 
5.4 
2.7 
Note: Retained imports are computed assuming that the value of a good is recorded identically when it is 
imported and when it is reexported. Special trade excludes both reexports and non-retained imports. 
Source: Tables 4.1, 4.5. 
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Figure 4.2 Spice markups, 1580-1890 (Bulbeck et aI., 1998) 
concludes that there is evidence of a "truly international market for wheat from 
around 1835." This evidence (cf. Federico and Persson, 2007) is important, 
since it shows that international price convergence characterized the nine-
teenth century as a whole, not just the years after 1870. 
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Table 4.5 Exports plus imports as share of GDP 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
5.5% 14% 20% 
7.5% 17.5% 
9.8% 8.2% 10.7% 
35.7% 
31.7% 
13.0% 20.2% 23.6% 
19.2% 23.2% 36.8% 
42.7% 45.6% 
19.4% 
16;1% 18.3% 
Netherlands 85% 82% 84% 110% 33.0% 25.8% 53.4% 96.4% 115.4% 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Best guess 
at total 
European 
trade-to-
GDPratio 
Ibid., net of 
ifI!ra-
European 
trade 
19% 20% 
16% 6.0% 
5.7% 
24% 21.4% 18.8% 
13.5% 11.5%' 
3.8% 
33~9% 
42.4% 33.9% 33.7% 
8.5% 10.6% 12.1% 
6.8% 13.8% 20.0% 29.4% 
25.2% 27.8% 41.8% 43.6% 
15.4% 18.1% 24.8% 29.9% 
8.9% 9.20/0 
Note: Ottoman Empire, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia are not included in total Europe. "United 
Kingdom" pre-1800 is just England and Wales. 
Sources: Pre-1800: Deane and Cole, 1962, 1969; Davis, 1969, 1979; Officer, 2001; Crafts, 1985a; Maddison, 
2001; de Vries and van der Woude, 1997; McCusker, 1978; Arnould, 1791; Daudin, 2005; Marczewski, 1961; 
Prados de la Escosura, 1993. Post-1800: Bairoch, 1976; and data underlying Prados de la Escosura, 2000. 
Another important change after 1800 concerns the types of commodities 
which could be transported profitably between continents. As Table 4.6 
shows, European imports from the rest of the world before then were mostly 
high value-to-weight ratio commodities, which could bear the cost of trans-
port because they were not produced in Europe at all, or only with some 
difficulty. There was a gradual evolution, to be sure. During the sixteenth 
century, silver and spices were the dominant imports from the Americas and 
Asia respectively. Around the middle of the seventeenth century, Indian 
textiles became the leading European import from Asia, but the European 
textile industry was still uncompetitive relative to Indian weavers. Around 
the same time, "colonial goods" such as sugar and tobacco were becoming 
important New World exports, but these were warm-climate commodities 
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Figure 4.3 Anglo-American wheat trade, 1800-2000 (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2005, p. 10) 
that could not be easily grown in western Europe. There was thus an 
evolution in the nature of intercontinental trade during the early modern 
period, towards bulkier commodities, but the period before 1800 did not, for 
the most part, involve large-scale intercontinental trade in basic, heavy 
commodities such as wheat, which could be easily grown both inside and 
outside Europe. 
The new transport technologies of the nineteenth century meant that such 
basic, "competing" commodities could indeed be shipped across the oceans of 
the world. European prices for temperate-climate agricultural commodities 
now started to reflect American, Australian and Russian factor endowments 
rather than demand and supply in western Europe alone, implying that, in line 
with Heckscher-Ohlin logic, cheap overseas food started to place European 
land rents under pressure (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2005). This would only 
become important in the years after 1870, when these Heckscher-Ohlin forces 
would have important political repercussions. However, the seeds of that 
retreat from globalization were sown in the half century following Waterloo. 
Trade, empire, and growth 
Recent aggregate evidence suggests that trade was positively associated with 
growth in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Both the 
urbanization rate and GDP grew more rapidly in the "Atlantic" European 
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Table 4.6 Composition of European overseas imports, 1513-1780 
A Imports from Asia to Lisbon, 1513-1610 (% by weight) 
1513-19 1523++31 154'l-8 158'l48 1600;;;3 160&-410 
Pepper 80.0 84.0 89.0 68.0 65 69.0 
Other spices 18.4 15.6 9.6 11.6 16.2 10.9 
Indigo 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 4.4 7.7 
Textiles 0.2 0.0 0.0 10.5 12.2 'l.8 
Misc. 1.4 0.4 1.4 1.5 2.2 4.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 
B Imports of Dutch East India Company into Europe, 1619-1780 (% by invoice value) 
1619i421 1648;;00 166a...70 169a...1700 173a...40 177g...s0 
Pepper 56.5 50.4 30.5 1U! 8.1 9.0 
Other spices 17.6 17.9 12.1 11.7 6.1 3.1 
Textiles 16.1 14.2 36.5 54.7 41.1 49.5 
Tea and coffee 4.2 32.2 27.2 
Drugs, perfumes, and dye-stuffs 9.8 8.5 5.8 8.3 2.8 1.8 
Sugar 6.4 4.2 0.2 3.7 0.6 
Saltpetre 2.1 5.1 3.9 2.6 4.4 
Metals 0.1 0.5 5.7 5.3 1.1 2.7 
Misc. 0.2 0.1 0.4 2.3 1.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 
C Imports of English East India Company into Europe, 1668-1760 (% of invoice value) 
Pepper 
Textiles 
Raw silk 
Tea 
Coffee 
Indigo 
Saltpetre 
Mise. 
Total 
166a...70 1698-1700 173a...40 175a...60 
25.25 7.02 3.37 4.37 
56.61 73.98 69.58 53.51 
0.6 7.09 10.69 12.27 
0.03 1.13 10.22 25.23 
0.44 1.93 2.65 
4.25 2.82 
7.67 1.51 1.85 2.97 
5.15 4.52 1.44 1.65 
100 100 100 100 
economies (England, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) than in the 
rest of western Europe or Asia between 1500 and 1800 (Acemoglu et al., 2005; 
Maddison, 2003a). AlIen (2003) also finds a strong positive relationship 
between trade and growth in Europe during this period, concluding that "the 
intercontinental trade boom was a key development that propelled north-
western Europe forwards" (p. 432). 
Table 4.6 (cont.) 
D Estimated annual sales of colonial imports, England and Netherlands, 1751-4 
Total sales (1000 ~SO$) Percentage of sales 
From Asia Of total 
Textiles 6750 41.7 2t;:" 
Pepper 1100 6.8 3.4 
Tea 2800 17.3 8.7 
Coffee 1000 6.2 3.1 
Spices 1850 11.4 5.8 
Mise. 27'00 16.7 8A 
Total from Asia 16200 100.0 50.5 
From Americas Of total 
Sugar 8050 50.8 25.1 
Tobacco 3700 23.3 11.5 
Mise. 4100 25.9 12.8 
Total from Americas 15850 100.0 49.5 
Total overseas imports 32050 100.0 
Source: Findlay and Q'Rourke, 2007, pp. 30S-{)9. 
The conclusion that trade and growth were positively related during the 
period is an important one. However, it is less clear what the mechanisms 
linking trade with economic growth were. Different authors, discussing the 
impact of trade on various European countries, tend to assume different 
mechanisms, while to make matters even more complicated the literature 
very often (if understandably, given the realities of mercantilism) conflates 
two conceptually distinct issues, namely the impact of trade in general and the 
effects of countries' colonial policies. In what follows we therefore look at the 
mechanisms through which, it has been suggested, trade might have influenced 
growth. We then consider the link between imperialism per se and economic 
welfare, using the Iberian loss of its Latin American colonies as a "natural 
experiment." Finally, we take a more detailed look at the various links between 
trade and the central economic event of this period, the British Industrial 
Revolution. 
Mechanisms 
How might trade have affected growth during this period? One crucial issue is 
whether or not all resources in the economy were fully employed. With full 
~10 Kevin H. Q'Rourke, Leandro Prados de la Escosura, and Guillaume Daudin 
employment, allocating resources to exports had an opportunity cost, as they 
could alternatively have been used in production for the domestic market. 
While a "comparative advantage" perspective leads to the conclusion that 
trade was beneficial for economies, it also tends to imply that the gains involved 
were small (since the Harberger triangles measuring the gains of moving to free 
trade from some protectionist equilibrium are small relative to the size of the 
overall economy). Thus Thomas and McCloskey (1981) among others con-
clude that if the British economy had been shut offfrom trade at the time of the 
Industrial Revolution, it would have produced a lot less cotton, but a lot more of 
other commodities, and sustained only a small welfare loss. 
An alternative Smithian "vent for surplus" perspective assumes that resour-
ces in many eighteenth-century economies were unemployed, or at least under-
employed, and that trade could bring these resources into productive (or more 
productive) employment at little or no opportunity cost. In this case, trade 
would have a bigger effect on economic growth, as O'Brien and Engerman 
(1991) argue for the British case. 
Faced with these two alternatives, some researchers have adopted the eclectic 
solution of providing upper (unemployment) and lower (full employment) 
bounds for the impact of trade or empire on particular economies. 
Nevertheless, both approaches tend to produce small numbers, with the esti-
mated contribution of empire or trade to growth remaining modest compared 
with the expansion of the domestic market. This is not surprising, since both 
approaches are essentially static, whereas economic growth is a dynamic 
process, involving both capital accumulation and technological change. 
While any rigorous assessment of the impact of trade on economic growth 
requires specifying a theoretical model, be it static or dynamic, many traditional 
economic historians have preferred to give qualitative accounts emphasising 
the impact of trade on particular regions or sectors. In the case of eighteenth-
century France, for example, Butel and Crouzet (1998) have depicted imperial 
expansion in (and thus trade with) America and Asia as a non-negligible 
contribution to growth that was, however, concentrated both by region - in 
the Atlantic ports (Bordeaux, Nantes, Le Havre) and their immediate hinter-
lands - and by sector. Colonies represented a significant market for French 
industry, since they accounted for 45 percent of the total increase in manufac-
tured exports during the eighteenth century. While such figures should be 
tempered by the fact that on the eve of the French Revolution exports repre-
sented only 7 percent of industrial output, and colonial exports even less (only 
2.5 percent), the impact of these exports was concentrated in a few sectors 
(linen especially), implying proportionately greater effects there. Similarly, 
around 15 percent of Portuguese linen output was exported to Brazil in the 
early nineteenth century (Pedreira, 1993). Butel and Crouzet also stress the 
feedbacks from colonial trade to non-exporting industries, including sugar 
refining, shipbuilding and its ancillary activities, and the shipping industry, 
since transportation was on French ships. 
In the case of Spain, trade with America increased between 1714 and 1796, 
especially during the late eighteenth century, promoting monetization and 
market orientation at a time of growing population pressure and rising land 
rents. Trade stimulated industry and services, in particular shipbuilding and its 
associated activities (iron, timber, and cordage industries). Exports to the 
colonies benefited some industries and regions, but the small share of industrial 
goods and commercial services supplied to Latin America by Iberian firms and 
merchants before the breakup of their empires stands in contrast to the linkages 
forged between the British economy and Britain's overseas territories and 
markets. Monetization, the commercialization of agriculture, and the stimulus 
of particular industries, such as the iron industry, are also seen as major benefits 
offoreign trade in Russia during this period (Kahan, 1985). 
Recent research has downplayed Spanish gains from colonial trade (Prados 
de la Escosura, 1993). The composition of trade suggests that the possibility of 
increasing production by reallocating resources was small, and that most gains 
possibly resulted from changing consumption patterns. By 1792, over 60 
percent of retained imports consisted of cocoa and sugar. Furthermore, these 
colonial products could have been acquired on international markets. 
Consequently, gains from colonial trade would only occur if, given colonial 
rule, Spain acquired the same commodities at lower prices. Furthermore, 
Spain's dependence on the colonies for raw materials was very small (raw 
cotton and dyestuffs only represented 4 percent of retained imports in 1792). 
This is, of course, a measure of the weakness of domestic manufacturing. In the 
Catalan cotton textile industry (one of the most dynamic industries at the end 
of the eighteenth century), European cotton yarn imports were more important 
than colonial raw cotton imports, suggesting how weak the Catalan spinning 
industry was at the time. 
Industrial exports, concentrated in a few sectors (textiles: 36.6 percent in 
1792; iron and steel: 3.2 percent; paper: 4.4 percent; and food: 22.3 percent) 
stimulated industrial expansion and were associated with some external econo-
mies in their regions of origin. Colonial protectionist legislation made Spanish 
manufactures artificially competitive on the Spanish American market. An 
upper bound computation suggests that exports of domestic manufactures to 
the colonies made a 5 percent contribution to industrial value added before the 
Napoleonic wars (ibid.). 
One way of gauging the importance of overseas trade to the economies of 
western Europe is to see what happened when the trade between continental 
Europe and the Americas was suppressed by British blockades after 1807. 
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Crouzet (1964, p. 571) presents a vivid picture of a deindustrializing west 
European seaboard during this period: "Harbors were deserted, grass was 
growing in the streets, and in large towns like Amsterdam, Bordeaux, and 
Marseille, population did actually decrease." Industries which particularly 
suffered included shipbuilding and those processing colonial raw materials 
such as sugar and tobacco. A variety of food-processing industries were also 
badly affected, as well as cotton printing, but the most important victim was the 
linen industry in regions such as western France, Flanders, Holland, and 
Germany. According to Crouzet (p. 573), the damage done to the outward-
oriented Atlantic economy of continental western Europe was permanent. On 
the other hand, trade disruption also led to the development of import sub-
stituting industries protected from British competition by wartime blockades, 
notably the cotton textile industry. To repeat, in a world with scarce resources 
which can be transferred from one activity to another, there is a limit to how 
great can be the static welfare losses associated with trade disruption, unless one 
assumes asymmetries across sectors (for example, associated with externalities: 
Engerman, 1998). 
Daudin (2006) abandons this essentially static perspective in favor of a more 
dynamic one, focused on profits and capital accumulation. The question he 
addresses is the extent to which colonial profits contributed to capital forma-
tion in France before the Revolution. Net reinvested profits linked to the 
overseas sector represented up to 6 percent of French savings, and were 
responsible for approximately 7 percent of French GDP per capita growth 
between 1715 and 1790. This implies that by 1790 GDP would have been 
only 3 percent smaller in their absence. However, a further conjectural exercise 
(Daudin, 2004), assuming that high overseas profits encouraged investment 
throughout the economy, suggests that they might have been responsible for as 
much as one-third of French growth. 
A very different mechanism linking trade and growth was proposed by 
Voltaire more than two centuries ago. He argued that Britain's success in 
trade and the freedom of its constitution mutually reinforced each other in a 
virtuous circle: "trade, which has made richer the citizens of England, has 
helped to make them free, and this freedom has, in turn, enlarged trade" 
(cited in Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007, p. 347). Similarly, Acemoglu et al. 
(2005) claim that Atlantic trade strengthened the political power of merchants, 
who obtained a strengthening of property rights in consequence. According to 
these authors, such beneficial political consequences of trade did not occur in 
states which had initially been more absolutist than, say, Britain, and there is 
certainly a case to be made that imperialism strengthened rather than weakened 
absolutist monarchs in Iberia at this time. In early modern Europe state power 
was constrained by the crown's need to raise taxes. The more kings depended 
on taxes, the less sovereign and autonomous they became. Colonial revenues 
allowed the rise of a strong political center which concentrated power without 
being drawn into extensive bargaining with its more prominent subjects and 
institutions. In Portugal, the tax on gold accounted for some 10 percent of 
public revenue in 1716, while by the 1760s, just before the gold and diamond 
mines started to decline, it provided a fifth of state receipts. Brazil supplied 
around 40 percent of government tax returns at the time of the Marquis of 
Pombal. In Spain, prior to the Napoleonic wars, crown revenues of colonial 
origin (including the surplus from colonial chests and those derived from 
customs duties) represented one-fourth of the total. In Spain, as in Portugal, 
bullion not only underpinned regal power but augmented the incomes of the 
aristocracy and thereby reduced their need to increase taxation and rents from 
the population. Thus the colonial empire helped to consolidate and stabilize 
traditional institutions and structures of power, status, and property rights 
within Iberia, implying comparatively few representative institutions there. 
The emancipation of the American colonies at the start of the nineteenth 
century marked the end of the Iberian ancien regime, and opened the way to 
liberal revolutions in Spain and Portugal with implications for the economic 
development and international position ofIberia that have remained largely unex-
plored. Accounts of economic backwardness in nineteenth-century Iberia have 
often placed the blame on the loss of empire, but this may in fact have contributed 
significantly to the economic and social modernization of the peninsula. 
In summary, the existing literature on the relationship between trade and 
growth is unsatisfactory in several respects. While the cross-country evidence 
indicates that there was a clear positive relationship between trade and growth, 
individual country studies have for the most part not identified mechanisms 
that can account for this. The political economy analysis of Acemoglu et al. 
(2005) seems promising, but this is clearly an area where more research is 
required. 
and welfare 
The question of why European countries chose to build empires has long been 
controversial. Several hypotheses have been proposed, ranging from the purely 
economic to the purely political, with several intermediate cases as well. Among 
the more economic explanations is the Vinerian view which we have already 
encountered, that in the absence of integrated international markets, caused 
largely by insecurity in an age of widespread piracy and warfare, overseas 
expansion permitted the creation of reserved markets, thus inte~~ll;c, 
quest and trade. If Spanish merchants, say, were to be able to trar 'in a given .. \ 
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area, the Spanish government would have to make this possible by excluding 
other merchants and governments from that area, since otherwise the Spanish 
would themselves be excluded. This is not to deny that a generally free trading 
situation would have been preferable to one in which each country pursued a 
mercantilist strategy which might have been individually rational, from a 
military or even economic viewpoint, but which produced a collectively sub-
optimal outcome. From a historical point of view, however, one can ask: is this a 
realistic counterfactual, in a world without a collective security regime? Findlay 
and O'Rourke (2007, p. 229) argue that for the individual European state, 
pondering what such a unilateral conversion to peaceful free trade might 
bring, "in the absence of ... a clearly defined hegemonic power, military defeat 
and exclusion from foreign markets" seems a plausible answer. 
Other less economic explanations for empire have also been proposed. For 
example, in response to the question of why, once the technological constraints 
that impeded long-distance oceanic voyages had been removed, only some 
European countries established colonies overseas, Elliott (1990) proposed an 
explanation based on previous histories of expansion. Iberian plunder, settlement, 
and colonization in the Americas, in this view, represented a follow-up to the 
reconquest ("reconquista") of territories previously under Muslim control, while 
England's overseas expansion in the seventeenth century followed the conquest of 
Ireland in the previous century. Why did other countries in Europe eventually 
join them? Here Elliott points to competition between European nation-states, 
which triggered an emulation process leading to the seizure and occupation of 
New World lands. In this scenario, the fact that all of Europe ultimately became 
involved in overseas expansion was at least in part unintended. 
Another view points to the interconnections between empire and nation-state 
building, with countries in Europe struggling not to be left behind. This interpre-
tation regards as economistic and anachronistic the view that states and merchants 
needed reserved markets and supply sources in an uncertain world, and regards 
colonies not as an investment, but rather as costs paid for non-economic ends 
(Engerman, 1998). The costs of empire are undeniable, since colonies needed to be 
acquired, settled, and defended. Wars, loss of life, and ships represented - from a 
purely economic perspective - a diversion of resources from alternative uses. War 
costs had to be financed through taxes, inflation, or public debt. Besides, the 
colonial system involved navigation laws that imposed an implicit tax on consum-
ers, as they usually had to pay a price above that of the most efficient producer. 
A recurring theme in the Iberian literature is whether Portugal and Spain did 
not develop because, when building their empires, the metropolitan economy 
was disregarded. Did empires represent a significant opportunity cost, absorb-
ing resources that could have been allocated to productive investment 
(Fontana, 1991), or were such costs a prerequisite for economic development? 
Trade and 
In order to realize the potential inherent in the discovery of the resource-
abundant but labor-scarce Americas, the Iberian powers required continuous 
investment in social overhead capital (ports, roads, housing, internal trans-
portation, and oceanic shipping) and the establishment of new political and 
commercial organizations. This task, while benefiting the rest of Europe, was 
mainly undertaken by Iberians for at least 150 years after Columbus (O'Brien 
and Prados de la Escosura, 1998). In the case of Portugal, it might be argued 
that emigration deprived the country of manpower, skills, and entrepreneur-
ship, since emigrants were young males, and more literate and ambitious than 
average. On the other hand, emigration made possible the colonization of new 
territories, opening new markets and providing luxuries and tropical groceries 
at lower cost. Furthermore, emigration eased economic conditions in the more 
densely populated areas, especially in the northwest. 
Ironically, in the light of this literature, it may be the flow of resources from 
the Americas to Iberia that did the most damage to the Spanish and Portuguese 
economies in the long run. First, as we have already seen, bullion flows 
strengthened absolutist monarchies and central governments, with damaging 
political and economic consequences. Second, the inflow of specie, gold in 
Portugal and silver in Spain, may have provoked a "Dutch disease" of sorts, 
damaging the competitiveness of local manufacturing industries (Forsyth and 
Nicholas, 1983; Drelichman, 2005). 
One way of assessing the importance of empire to the Iberian economies is to 
explore what happened after the loss of those empires. By 1827, once Brazil had 
severed its links to Portugal and declared full independence, real Portuguese 
domestic exports represented just two-thirds of their average level in 1796-
1806. However, this conceals a switch from industrial to agricultural exports, 
with Portugal reorienting its economy towards Britain by selling its primary 
produce in exchange for manufactures, in the context of improving terms of 
trade. Trade in services also suffered, with reexports contracting by one-fifth in 
real terms between the same dates. For example, Portugal could no longer be an 
entrepot for the produce of Brazil. Pedreira (1993) suggests that the loss of 
Brazil implied an upper bound loss of 8 percent of GDP. A widespread 
consensus views Portugal as being now confined to the role of supplier of 
foodstuffs and raw materials, with no opportunities to specialize within the 
more dynamic industrial sector. However, since the old colonial system did not 
bring Portugal to the verge of modern industrialization, its breakdown can 
hardly be blamed for the country's failure subsequently to industrialize. 
In contrast to Great Britain and the thirteen North American colonies, where 
commercial links were immediately and vigorously renewed after their independ-
ence (Shepherd and Walton, 1976), Spain and the new Latin American republics 
practically cut ties (except for the trade using Cuba as an entrepot). From the 
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beginning of the war with Britain in October 1796, Spain maintained almost no 
link with the colonies for more than two decades. The subsequent decline in 
domestic exports (roughly 25 percent between 1784-96 and 1815-20) can be 
attributed almost exclusively to the fall in colonial commerce (which shrank by 40 
percent). The consequence was the end of the long-standing equilibrium distri-
bution of domestic exports between the colonies and Europe (roughly one-third 
and two-thirds, respectively), and the establishment of a new distribution that 
continued throughout the nineteenth century (with foreign markets absorbing 
four-fifths). Retained imports of colonial goods for domestic consumption (which 
had represented one-third of total retained imports) were halved, but this was 
offset by imports from Europe. The collapse of trade with the empire was 
particularly significant for services (financial, insurance, transportation), as is 
revealed by the contraction of real reexports by three fifths between 1784-96 
and 1815-20. The Spanish balance of trade also felt the effects of colonial 
independence. Before the loss of empire, Spain had a deficit on current account 
with foreign countries that was balanced by a corresponding surplus in colonial 
trade. With colonial emancipation this balancing mechanism disappeared, with 
deflationary consequences for the domestic economy. Fortunately, a favorable 
terms of trade - resulting from an improvement vis-cl-vis Europe, more than 
matching a deterioration with respect to the colonies - increased the purchasing 
power per unit of exports by 20 percent between 1784-96 and 1815-20, allowing 
Spain to avoid further deterioration in the current -account balance. 
Prados de la Escosura (1993) has attempted a rough estimate of the real cost 
to Spain of the loss of its colonies, making assumptions favorable to the 
generally accepted view that the loss was significant. The first assumption is 
that the productive resources embodied in exportables did not have alternative 
uses in the domestic economy. A similar assumption is made regarding the 
services (shipping, insurance, mercantile) prOvided by Spanish subjects in the 
colonial trade. In contrast to the non-colonial trade, almost totally carried on 
non-Spanish ships, Spanish colonial legislation ensured that the Indies trade 
used only national shipping. Therefore, with the decline of Spanish American 
trade, a decline in Spanish maritime services closely followed. The loss in 
revenues due to the cessation of precious metal shipments, and the reduction 
of customs duties resulting from colonial independence, were also taken into 
account, the assumption being that public revenues from the colonies were 
productively used in the domestic economy. The upper bound estimate of 
Spanish losses implied by these assumptions was not more than 8 percent of 
national income. And while it could be argued that the profits from colonial 
trade represented a high proportion of the funds used to finance investment in 
Spain, an upper bound estimate of their contribution to total capital formation 
is below 18 percent by 1784-96. 
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Figure 4.4 Spanish terms of trade vis-a.-vis Britain, 1714-1882 (Prados de la Escosura, 
1994) 
The long-term consequences of the loss of the colonies depended on the 
flexibility and dynamic nature of the industry concerned. The decline in manu-
factured exports from many sectors illustrates the lack of competitiveness of 
Spanish industries: Spain could not offer the Latin American consumer either 
the prices or the quality of its west European competitors, specifically Great 
Britain. For example, the Basque iron and steel industry (which sold at least a 
third of its output to colonial markets at the end of the eighteenth century) 
became uncompetitive from the 1770s onward. A similar situation characterized 
the Valencia silk industry. Between the 1790s and the 1820s net exports of raw silk 
rose while net imports of silk textiles increased. Catalan shipping was yet another 
industry which had grown under colonial protection and suffered afterwards. 
However, Catalan cotton textiles developed further once the colonial market had 
been lost. The more competitive and flexible sectors of the economy eventually 
adapted to new circumstances, particularly commercial agriculture, which turned 
towards growing markets in western Europe. As mentioned earlier, the nine-
teenth century was a good time to do this, in that the terms of trade moved 
favorably for agricultural producers, with technological progress lowering the 
prices of industrial goods and growing demand raising relative agricultural prices 
(Figure 4.4). The loss of the colonies had a less profound and widespread impact 
upon the Spanish economy than the historical literature has suggested. 
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Chapter 1 of this volume provided a broad overview of Europe's transition to 
modern economic growth. We now focus on one particular aspect of this 
transition and ask: what was the impact of trade (and therefore empire, since 
the two were so closely related during this period) on the British Industrial 
Revolution? As we have seen, the cross-country econometric evidence indi-
cates that there was a positive relationship between trade and growth during 
this period, but uncertainty remains about what was driving this correlation. 
What can we say about the relationship between trade and growth in this 
canonical case? 
The literature on this issue has largely been shaped by the dominant eco-
nomic theories of the day. One particularly influential strand of thought has 
been inspired by the assumption of classical economists, from Smith to Marx, 
that growth depends on investment, which depends on savings, which depends 
on profits (since workers were assumed to be too poor to save, and landlords 
too frivolous). In a famous book, Eric Williams (1966) argued that Atlantic 
slave trade profits financed the Industrial Revolution. His largely anecdotal 
evidence consisted of enumerating cases in which those associated with slavery 
made investments in domestic British industry. The classic quantitative 
responses to Williams were made by Engerman (1972) and O'Brien (1982), 
both of whom measured the profits associated with the slave trade (or, in the 
case of O'Brien, with Britain's transoceanic activities more generally), and 
found these to have been too small to have possibly mattered. For example, 
O'Brien found that the total profits accruing to those engaged in trade and 
commerce with the 'periphery' in 1784-86 amounted to £5.66 million. If 30 
percent of these profits were saved and reinvested, then that would have 
financed roughly 15 percent of British gross investment during that period. 
Since 15 percent was, for O'Brien, a small figure, the Williams thesis 'foundered 
on the numbers' (p. 16). 
There is a more fundamental problem with the Williams thesis, which is that 
technological change rather than capital accumulation was the ultimate driving 
force behind the Industrial Revolution. By focusing on profits as the possible 
link between overseas trade, empire, and slavery on the one hand, and 
European growth on the other, Williams and others have been barking up 
the wrong channel. If Marxist economic theory is ill-suited to explain the 
Industrial Revolution, so too is Keynesian theory, by definition, since Keynes 
was concerned with the short-run determination of output and employment, 
not with long-run economic growth. This has not prevented various historians 
from attempting to argue that overseas demand exogenously boosted British 
industrial output during the transition to modern growth. As almost 60 percent 
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Figure 4.5 Demand versus supply during the Industrial Revolution (Findlay and Q'Rourke, 
2007, p. 306) 
of British cotton textile exports went to non-European countries during 1784-6 
(Davis, 1979), such a claim is understandable. However, growth is ultimately a 
supply-side phenomenon, and, indeed, if growth had been due to rising over-
seas demand, then Britain's terms of trade should have increased during the 
Industrial Revolution, whereas in fact they fell, reflecting the cost-reducing 
nature of the innovations concerned (McCloskey, 1981; Mokyr, 1977). 
Figure 4.5 makes the point in a simple manner. According to Crafts and 
Harley (1992), industrial output rose by roughly 235 percent between 1780 
and 1831, while GDP rose by roughly 135 percent. If the income-elasticity of 
demand was unity, and foreign incomes rose at the same rate as British ones, 
then the demand for British manufactures at constant prices rose by roughly 
135 percent. This can be illustrated by the outward shift of demand from D to 
D' (ignore D" and D'" for now). If the industrial supply curve were vertical, it 
would have shifted out by 235 percent, intersecting D' at the new equilibrium, 
denoted by point B. The available data on the British terms of trade suggest that 
at this point, relative manufactured goods prices were (very roughly speaking) 
55 percent lower than in the initial equilibrium A. If the elasticity of supply were 
unity, on the other hand, the supply curve would have shifted out (at constant 
prices) by 290 percent (=135+ 100+55), far more than the 135 percent outward 
shift in demand. 
Findlay (1990) provides a simple general equilibrium model of the late-
eighteenth-century Atlantic economy which, although it is static, can still 
help in thinking about how trade really mattered during the Industrial 
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Revolution. That revolution was initially heavily concentrated in cotton textiles, 
and British imports of raw cotton came exclusively from outside Europe, 
particularly from the Americas? The American supply was highly elastic, as a 
result of the then seemingly limitless endowment of New World land, and the 
highly elastic supply of slave labor. The Industrial Revolution meant a large 
increase in the demand for raw cotton, and hence a rise in its price at home and 
abroad, implying a deterioration in Britain's terms of trade. High American 
supply elasticities minimized this terms of trade loss - in the absence of slaves 
and New World land, relative raw cotton prices would have increased by more 
than they actually did, potentially choking off growth in this crucial sector. The 
existence of overseas markets also implied a higher demand for cotton textiles, 
and a more elastic demand as well. As can be seen from Figure 4.5, a given 
supply shift due to industrial innovation would have had a smaller output 
effect, and reduced cotton textiles prices by even more than was actually the 
case, with inelastic demand (compare the shift from D to D' with the shift from 
D" to D"'). 
Not only did trade ensure that a given supply side impulse travelled further; 
it also probably ensured more innovation, which was both motivated by profits 
and expensive (AlIen, 2006). Large fixed research and development costs 
implied that innovators had to make profits just to break even, and larger 
markets helped innovators recoup those fixed costs. Furthermore, under cer-
tain circumstances larger markets imply more elastic demand curves for 
individual monopolistically competitive firms (Desmet and Parente, 2006). 
Thus a given price-reducing innovation will imply larger sales and revenue 
increases in larger markets, meaning that as markets expand, innovation 
becomes more likely. While this mechanism has yet to be quantified, presum-
ably a closed Britain (even a closed Britain miraculously enabled to grow 
cotton) would not have experienced as much innovation as was in fact 
observed. Unlike China or the Mughal Empire, it was too small to rely on its 
domestic markets. As it was, increases in exports were equivalent to 21 percent 
of the total increase in GDP between 1780 and 1801 (Crafts, 1985a, p. 131), over 
50 percent of additional industrial output during the same period (Cuenca 
Esteban, 1997), and over 60 percent of additional textiles output between 1815 
and 1841 (Harley, 1999, p. 187). 
Furthermore, between 1780 and 1801 the Americas accounted for roughly 60 
percent of additional British exports (O'Brien and Engerman, 1991, p. 186). 
British innovators were largely dependent on overseas markets as their indus-
tries expanded. The implication, in a mercantilist world in which nations 
2 Pomeranz (2000) emphasizes the benefits to Europe of access to the raw materials of the New World, an advantage denied 
to the Chinese economy of the time. 
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systematically excluded their enemies from protected markets, is that British 
military success over the French and other European rivals was one ingredient 
in explaining its subsequent rise to economic prominence. It was certainly not 
on its own a sufficient condition - since domestic conditions had to be right 
in order to spur innovation in the first place - but possibly a necessary one. 
